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Abstract It is still a popular philosophical position to call for a strict “separationism”
concerning the private and the public sphere when it comes to religious convictions.
Richard Rorty is one prominent supporter of this claim. The traditional critique against
this division is mostly built on a particular characterization of religion that is at odds
with Rortian assumptions. In this article, however, Rorty is criticized on his own terms
turning pragmatically the objection to a fully internal one. What Rorty values most,
namely a tolerant and ironic liberalism as the capacity to describe oneself in new and
interesting ways is precisely the role, I argue, that religious faith could play under
“neo-liberal” conditions.
Keywords Rorty · Irony · (Neo)liberalism · Privacy · Public sphere · Metaphysics ·
(Self)understanding
Introduction
Few people would still claim that religion’s social place should be one of complete pri-
vacy. But there are indeed many claiming that religion’s epistemic grounds are defined
by private structures only. The first claim is a normative call for an ultimate restriction
of religion due to the ramified difficulties of living within a pluralistic society. The
second claim is a descriptively achieved conclusion focused either on religious prac-
tices or on the very grammar of the faith that citizens actually practice. Both claims are
under pressure although the second has gained a bit more sympathy, especially from
Lutheran theologians (of a certain kind) underlining the ‘inwardness of faith’ or the
‘inner impression’ of Jesus as (moral) example. I am thinking here of some pietistic and
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liberal writers with very particular (and ‘particular’ means: single-minded) readings
of the early Schleiermacher. The majority of theologians, however, has criticized this
strand of thought, emphasizing that religion is part of our social interaction or as Paul
Tillich put it, that Christianity belongs to the “substance of culture”.1 If one denies
the second descriptive claim (that religion is essentially private), the first normative
claim (that religion is to be limited to the private sector) is intelligible which would
mean: religion should be private, because it is not private per se.
One of the most prominent supporters of this latter claim—oscillating in a prob-
lematic manner between description and normativity—is Richard Rorty (1931–2007).
What others consider to be completely confused, namely to banish faith as publically
excised act to the ‘private igloo’, is exactly what Rorty is eagerly interested in achiev-
ing—for very different reasons and with a specific understanding of ‘privacy’ that is
particularly inspired by John Stuart Mill. The author of the famous On Liberty argues
strictly for a separation between the private and the public, taking these spheres to be
the realms of personal freedom and legal regulation, respectively. One could maintain
that the Millian liberalism is nothing but a strong juxtaposition of both conflicting sec-
tors celebrating the value of the private domain and accepting the practical necessity
of the public constrains.2 In this sense Rorty is Mill’s inheritor.
The goal of my article is, first, to understand better Rorty’s background assumptions
for his critical claim; second to outline the context, in which he deals with religion, i.e.
his picture of a liberal and ironic society governed by tolerance, the foremost enemy
of which is allegedly religious orthodoxy in any stripes; and finally, to contemplate
the possibility, pace Rorty, that at least the Christian tradition is not only one impor-
tant source of Rorty’s own irony, but also an essential amplifier for the core activity
in which ironic liberals should be engaged: finding new descriptions for our under-
standings of public and private selves. This leads to a kind of criticism that sticks to
Rorty’s own conditions, turning the critique to a fully internal one without signing
up something that the neo-Millian liberal would refute. Speaking non-metaphorically
my thesis is that what Rorty values most—private freedom and publically secured
tolerance—is not threatened by religion but deepened because religion is a specific
mode of living in new possibilities. Speaking metaphorically my thesis is that the tem-
perature in religion’s private igloo increases constantly, the igloo melts destabilizing
the icy wall between it and the public, eventually breaking down altogether.
On separating the private and the public
Rorty’s separation between the private and the public sphere is not primarily con-
cerned with religion or religious movements and their eventually negative influence.
Rather, this bivalent interpretative structure pervades Rorty’s whole thinking, at least
his post-analytic period (earlier, he had not been interested in these kinds of debates at
all). In other words, religion—in a very broad and unspecific sense—is not more than
one of many important instantiations of an ideally private business that can interfere in
1 Cf. Tillich (1975, p. 84).
2 For John Stuart Mill’s liberalism see Rössler (2007, esp. pp. 60–61).
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disturbing ways with social, public and political interests; other examples of a similar
kind may be sports, arts, or certain political, sexual and even other moral ways of
orientation that belong strictly to the private sector.
Rorty biggest fear is that religion could smuggle private interests into the sphere of
publicity. As far as I can see, he does not argue positively for the separation needed so
urgently, but solely by referring to the negative consequences that such a smuggling
in would entail (cf. PC, 35, 37).3 Whatever these ‘consequences’ may be in detail,
traditionally, the thesis toward which Rorty is inclined can be presented in two ver-
sions: The empathetic one maintains that it is for religion’s own sake to remain private,
whereas the second one calls critically for restricting religious ambitions in times of
cultural clashes. The fact that Rorty underlines the ‘negative consequences’ makes it
clear that he prefers the latter reading.4
His reaction is, to put it briefly, to privatize religion. Adopting arguments from Mill
and William James he promotes the “Jeffersonian compromise” that is built on the
traditional idea that “the secularization of public life is the Enlightenment’s central
achievement”.5 Although Rorty will criticize the basic reasons James put forward for
defending the “compromise” he still defends the conclusion “keeping [religion] out
of […] ‘the public square’, making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussion
of public policy” (SH, 169). Rorty’s own reason in favor of the “compromise” (as the
best of different bad options) is still very simple; he states:
The main reason religion needs to be privatized is that, in political discussion
with those outside the relevant religious community, it is a conversation-stopper.6
Thus, the separation between the private and the public is, according to Rorty, one of
the most important distinctions we have to draw and to save (cf. PZ, 120). The private
is the sphere of “self-creation” and “self-perfection”—a room in which it is allowed
and possible to find to oneself even by idiosyncratic ways, means and detours. Privacy
is here (and in Mill’s case too) focused on or even reduced to freedom and freedom
is understood as individual freedom without recognizing that the private goes beyond
negative civil rights.7 The public is not confined on achieving something ‘good’, but
on avoiding the varieties of its opposite; it has neither an intrinsic, nor a contingent
3 I will use abbreviations for Rorty’s publications; see references.
4 Unfortunately, Rorty is hardly interested in the historical background(s) of the debate over the state-
church-separation or, more generally, the allegedly clear cut between privacy and publicity. Charles Taylor,
however, reminds us of the twofold task the separation had to fulfill: not only to protect the state against
religious infiltration, but also to protect the personal religion against the dominance of the Great Awakening
in relation to other religious orientations; see Taylor (2002, p. 19).
5 Rorty, “Religion As Conversation-stopper” [1994], in SH (169 & 168), and TP (42 & 44).
6 Ibid., p. 171. One might ask which religion Rorty has in mind: the Lutheran church in Europe or the south-
ern Baptists in Alabama or the growing Catholicism in Latin America? Rorty—as reader of Hegel—has no
notion that religion is one of the places where people give themselves a definition of truth and ‘negotiate’
what is relevant and important for them (see Hegel 1955, p. 125); and they will do so in very different ways
as they live under highly different circumstances. Nevertheless, one should not forget that Rorty writes as
an American who might have in mind a rigorous fundamentalism that does exist in central Europe as well
but not as a representative religious element.
7 See Rössler (2007, pp. 148–150).
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positive and material ideal. The public is only formally built upon the fight against
cruelty and the realization of tolerance for mankind and its solidarity.8
Rorty’s interest in personal freedom, which is based on a tolerant society that fights
against human cruelty, is near to be taken for granted, which might be the first step to
losing it. What leads notoriously to criticism, however, is that Rorty maintains both
spheres to be incommensurable. “Projects of individual self-expression” on the one
hand and “projects of social cooperation” on the other (PC, 35) rule each other out
although (or because) they are equivalent in terms of value and legitimacy (cf. CIS,
xiv).9 One could argue that Rorty’s famous book from 1989 Contingency, Irony and
Solidarity was initially written to describe what happens when self-creation (by phi-
losophy and literature) remains private without being compounded with the opposite
sphere of the public.
Now, even Jürgen Habermas—and in opposition to Rorty—in his late years came
to the conclusion that religion should play a major role in and for society. Therefore,
he leaves the old picture according to which the conflict is to be solved not by weak-
ening the religious claims but just by restricting their practical impact. Going beyond
this approach Habermas presents two considerations that could be interesting for the
Rortian ideal of a “conversation of mankind”. First, Habermas holds that religion
encompasses resources of meaning, sense and significance that are (to some extent)
translatable into a vocabulary that is accessible even for those who are “outside the
relevant religious community” (Rorty; see above).10 Second, the post-Enlightenment
Christianity has amplified the culture of discourse by strengthening the awareness of
the historical fact that we live in a “post-secular” and plural society; Schleiermacher
has played an important role for incorporating this new sensibility.11 Both aspects lead
to a possibility that is noted nowhere in Rorty’s œuvre, namely that society is not only
to be saved against inacceptable religious fundamentalists but also to be protected
against the danger of retiring into private life, i.e. the retreat into an indifference that
undermines every vivid public culture of debate.
Unfortunately, Rorty does not elucidate the relation between the private and the
public sphere apart from maintaining their separation; but even this claim is far from
precise. The main obstacle for clarification lies in neglecting important distinctions
such as between legal and civic (political), divine and secular (theological), religious
and secular (institutional) or religious in one sense and religious in another (interreli-
gious). Either Rorty thinks his public/private-bivalence does the job of all these pairs
8 Cf. Conant (2000, esp. pp. 283–291).
9 See PZ, 118–119, where Rorty underlines the importance of finding the right balance between ‘originality’
and ‘tolerance’.
10 Habermas (2005a, esp. pp. 134–137). One could ask whether the translation is an interreligious enter-
prise (translating a particular vocabulary into another religious vocabulary) or whether the translation means
the transfer into a non-religious language. The latter claim has some resemblance with Ernst Fuchs’ and
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s claim that Christianity in an atheist era has to speak in non-religious terms—etsi
Deus non daretur.
11 Habermas says (2005b, p. 251):
„Schleiermacher ist ein Schrittmacher für das Bewusstsein einer postsäkularen Gesellschaft, die sich
auf das Fortbestehen der Religion in einer sich fortwährend säkularisierenden Umgebung einstellt.“
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or he shows no real interest in these ramifications.12 In particular, he does not eluci-
date by which notion the contrast to ‘privacy’ is constituted. If it is the political stage
then privatizing religion just means that religious movements, sects or confessions
are not allowed to interfere politically. It is, of course, something different as soon as
we speak of the public as cultural publicity. In this regard privatizing religion would
express a much stronger claim itself near to be intolerant. Rorty, however, does not
distinguish between these divergent notions of the public and, accordingly, he can-
not admit that privatizing religion in the political sense is widely accepted precisely
because one wants to allow for not privatizing religion in the cultural sense (see above:
the ‘empathetic reading’).
Although Rorty thinks both spheres to be theoretically or principally equivalent,
making him call for finding the right balance between them (actually finding it is,
for Rorty, a kind of “wisdom”; cf. PZ, 118), it is not clear whether both spheres
are practically equivalent when we face conflicts between private hopes and social
needs—the type of conflicts that cause Rorty’s claim in the first place. Hence, one
might ask whether Rorty presents a conditional equivalence that is to be substituted
by the pragmatic priority of the public (or the private) if necessary. But if this priority
were so easily sustained, then we would have no real problem with the separation
hoped for; in other words, the fact that the public’s (or private’s) priority is questioned
often enough is not a threat to an accomplished solution, but one facet of the initial
problem.
What is clear, however, is that Rorty defends a strict ‘separationism’13 as a response
to the storm of consequences we have to deal with in rejecting his position—a position
he presents as non-metaphysical. To put it the other way round: He criticizes all
approaches of combining the private and the public as metaphysical enterprises; meta-
physics is, according to Rorty, nothing but the project of creating one single vocab-
ulary encompassing both sectors (cf. CIS, 120). Ironically, Rorty confronts us (and
himself) with the impoverished option between a metaphysical monism regarding the
one vocabulary for the public and the private on the one hand and on the other hand
the non- or post-metaphysical dualism consisting of two vocabularies, one for our
self-creation and, one for our social interactions. Traditionally, dualisms belong to the
metaphysical inheritance—so, what we get from Rorty is a very extravagant mixture
of a non-metaphysical metaphysics (see below).
This very mixture is the background for criticizing some of his most admired
heroes for not having paid attention to this basic demarcation. Heidegger and Derrida
are presented as great ‘private’, but blind ‘public’ philosophers [whereas Rorty says
the contrary concerning authors like John Rawls and Habermas (cf. PZ, 26 & 29)].
According to Rorty’s reading, Heidegger considers himself to be post-metaphysical
(not: anti-metaphysical) while simultaneously attempting implicitly to create a single
vocabulary for both spheres. The result, not this intention, makes Heidegger one of
the greatest philosophical reformer of language (cf. CIS, 112–115; PC, 170).
12 Connected to this problem is another: which kind of non-private organization is the addressee of Rorty’s
concern. Sometimes his criticism is focused on an anticlericalism; see esp. PS. Then, we had to deal with an
institutional challenge which begs the question: how to handle organizations under the institutional level?
13 See for this term Amesbury (2008, p. 205).
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In finding and inventing this language Heidegger faces two major problems.
Number one: How to write on and rewrite the development of metaphysical projects
without turning out to be a metaphysician (cf. CIS, 108)? Number two: How to write
on and rewrite without losing the audience, i.e. avoiding writing ‘only’ on a private
basis, not for public purposes? The first problem of self-application is circumvented in
Heidegger’s later philosophy by presenting de facto his vocabulary as both the result
of his search for the ‘right’ word and as only one provisional step within this search;
his vocabulary is a self-demolishing language without lamenting over this ongoing
process (cf. CIS, 117–118).14 The second problem of representing the public audience
leads, for Rorty, to the outlined confusion. Heidegger’s ambition to speak not only for
himself but to speak (in the mode of invitation) in the name of others separates him
from more cautious writers coming from literature. Marcel Proust is Rorty’s main
counterexample for confining what one writes to the private sector without any further
ambitions (CIS, 118).15 But Heidegger’s implicit search for the ‘last, final and closed
vocabulary’ is doomed to fail (cf. PZ, 67 & CIS, 96), because the claim to speak for
others is hardly justified and the hope to speak for others is often enough disappointed.
Therefore, Rorty confronts us with an unhappy alternative: either sticking to meta-
physical enterprises or separating private religion from the public sphere. But in
complaining about certain vocabularies Rorty himself uses, of course, a particular
terminology in publishing his (private—?) concern for the sake of the public. For
this purpose, he chooses a way that is dominated by spatial metaphors: He speaks of
“spheres” of privacy and the public, he speaks of “sectors” presupposing clear cuts and
a bivalence of only two “domains” or “squares”. This move does not come without a
price and leaves room for alternatives, i.e. alternative metaphors. Accordingly, I will
argue for turning Rorty’s fideistic (or solipsistic) either/or between monist metaphys-
ics and strictly dualist separation into a neither/nor by looking at the various ways in
which religious practices transcend private inwardness and demand socially relevant
publicity—then, the igloo will begin to melt.
Liberal ironists
Before exposing this neither/nor, we have to understand Rorty’s either/or. The main fig-
ure representing this choice is the liberal ironist who embodies the separation between
the private and the public. Her most important character traits are described by Rorty
as follows:
I use ‘ironist’ to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of
his or her own most central beliefs and desires – someone sufficiently histor-
icist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and
desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance. Liberal
ironists are people who include among these ungroundable desires their own
14 See, for instance, Heidegger (1959).
15 Another, philosophical, example is Nietzsche who gave up the idea to understand others and himself in
only one single vocabulary (which is, obviously, something different than to say, as Rorty seems to do, that
these vocabularies correspond to the both spheres of the public and the private; cf. CIS, xvi).
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hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by
other human beings may cease. [L]iberals are people who think that cruelty is
the worst thing we do.16
The major virtue of the liberal ironist is tolerance (cf. PZ, 180) secured by regarding
theories, vocabularies, novels, even religious practices as tools for private self-creation
or edification (cf. CIS, 96), none of which has an intended impact on the public sec-
tor. More precisely, ironic self-creation or edification does not necessarily contribute
to Rorty’s picture of a society that is governed by solidarity and tolerance (cf. CIS,
99–100). “Why not?”, one might ask, especially under Rorty’s own conditions (I will
come back to this point).
The main task the liberal ironist (or the ironic liberal) has to fulfill (or: the task that
makes someone ironic and liberal in the first place) is self-creation (i) by finding new
description (ii) using literature turning ‘self-creation’ into the ‘creation of the self’
(iii). I will try briefly to elucidate these three elements:
(i) The term “self-creation” is a Nietzschean one that substitutes God with the
human will and its ruthless or compassionate force as the ‘source of the self’; the
object remains creation’s object by becoming its subject.17 ‘Creation’ does not mean
that you change your corporeal appearance; beautifying surgeries are not necessarily
Nietzschean enterprises! What is meant is to understand oneself in new and interest-
ing ways—ways that indirectly but forcefully change oneself by altering the pictures,
narratives and attributes of this self. There is at least a threat of relativism, but the
hermeneutical process of this kind of self-understanding is not relativistic by
necessity.
Relativism should not be confused with contingency, and to deny the former does
not exclude the latter; that something is not relative does not imply, of course, that
it is without alternatives; it might be contingent which means that there are reasons
(pace relativism) but that they are not sufficient in terms of determining something
necessarily (pace what Rorty calls metaphysics). The ‘contingency of language’ is
Rorty’s main reference point insofar as language as tool of our self-understanding is
not arbitrary, on the one hand, but is not fixed as the ‘adequate’ description by real-
ity on the other. Reality (or the ‘world’, as Rorty sometimes says) does not decide
between different vocabularies as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ insofar as Rorty has abandoned
the Platonist view that language as such represents or “mirrors” the world (cf. CIS, 5–
6, 20–21, 99). This abandonment is at the heart of the disenchantment of the world18;
16 Rorty, CIS, xv (the last sentence stands in front of the rest of the quotation in the original); see also PZ,
48, 170, 179.
17 Another metaphor besides ,self-creation‘ is ‘self-enlargement’; see PZ, 7.
18 Or as Rorty says once:
If we cease to attempt to make sense of the idea of such a nonhuman language, we shall not be tempted
to confuse the platitude that the world may cause us to be justified in believing a sentence true with
the claim that the world splits itself up, on its own initiative, into sentence-shaped chunks called
‘facts’.
To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth,
that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
(CIS, 5; the order of both sentences is the other way round in the original).
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the reverse, however, consists in promoting the self to find coherent self-descriptions
on his own turning the so called self-perfection into a matter of private business (cf.
PC, 41 & 31).
(ii) Accordingly, Rorty’s trust in the force of language is eminent. Changing the
ways of describing oneself changes the self at the same time. Hence, the self is con-
sidered to be an entity embedded in descriptions.19 The plural—‘descriptions—is
important because the self could be characterized in many ways that might be incom-
mensurable: as autonomous person, as sinner, as legal addressee, etc.20 The ironist
does not try to reduce them but has the strength not only to deal with these different
voices, but to ‘celebrate’ them. Moreover, she is up to the task of finding even new
descriptions that might ‘fit’ ‘better’ her self-understanding. Both terms—‘fit’ and ‘bet-
ter’—are ambiguous: ‘fit’ does not mean that there is any standard ‘out there’ defining
the fitting, but the other way round: that new descriptions ‘emerge’ with their own
plausibility; and ‘better’ does not mean coming nearer to reality, but the other way
round: that new description touch our sense for what reality could possibly mean (cf.
CIS, 12, 16). Accordingly, the force of language does not consist in mirroring exactly
but in imagining creatively (cf. PMN, 382).
(iii) The central tool to achieve this self-creation is literature. Novels, in particular,
contribute to the recognition of the variety of life orientations, styles and preferences
that might be alien to other persons. Being confronted by Hans Castorp, The Count
Myshkin, Ulrich ‘the man without features’ or the cosmos of La recherche du temps
perdu widens our moral sense and gives access to the contingency of our own con-
victions, beliefs and commitments (although there are very different possibilities of
responses besides the enlargement of the moral sense—possibilities, like alienation,
Rorty has not in focus here; cf. R, 57). Although Rorty concentrates on discussing
novels he leaves room for other media such as biographies or the cinema as ‘tools’
(one of Rorty’s favorite metaphors in line with pragmatist thinking) for self-creation
understood as self-understanding.
Apart from this concession Rorty remains focused on literature,21 which is also, in
a way, revealing of his attitude towards religion. This attitude is developed in (at least)
three steps. Step one deals with philosophers like authors of fictive literature: “liter-
ally orientated intellectuals”, as he puts it, among them are: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche
and Heidegger (cf. PZ, 56–57), for whom the border between literature and philos-
ophy breaks down. Step two: Rorty thinks that philosophy has taken over the legacy
of religion, namely its salvific and reconciling force; the vanishing role of religious
confessions in the public does not entail the disappearance of the private need to be
redeemed; philosophy has now the task to fulfill this desire. Step three: Nowadays, phi-
losophy is itself in the course of being replaced be literature (step one & two). The hope
of reconciliation and redemption [whatever that could mean in Rorty’s (post)secular
19 See Schapp (1953).
20 Rorty celebrates Spinoza as the first ‘postmodern’ philosopher for allowing different incommensurable
descriptions referring to one single referent; cf. PZ, 105, 114 and TP, 16.
21 One important source for Rorty is Harold Bloom’s work on literature and his literature theory saying
that the act of reading is a process to become an autonomous self in the Heideggerian sense of ‘authenticity’
(Eigentlichkeit); cf. R, 49, 53.
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world]22 is comparatively stable, whereas the media of their realization change. This
last step is only partly presented in the indicative mood, but is rather an imperative
to run through a history of substitutions from religion via philosophy to literature (cf.
PC, 91–95; R 53; PZ, 185–186).23 We live now in the period of literature. What comes
next?24
What we have here is Rorty’s thesis of secularization which he does not present
at a descriptive level but in hope of speeding up this process. Insofar as he takes the
Enlightenment’s crucial achievement to be the secularization of the world—a world
not yet fully realized today—we have to strengthen the “Jeffersonian compromise”
by being more critical of the past and more open to new experiments in the future (cf.
SH, 168–169). It is no surprise that Rorty considers himself and the left liberal wing
to which he belongs to be an important amplifier of this process.25
What has all this to do with the strict separation as the Rortian dualism of spheres?
The threefold line of thought I outlined from self-creation (i) via searching for new
descriptions (ii) to the usage of literature as the contemporary tool of redemption (iii)
shows how difficult—not to say, impossible—it is to draw even heuristically the line
between the private and the public. ‘Irony’ seems to be a private endeavor, namely the
ability to play ironically with the contingent plurality of very different vocabularies;
‘liberal’ is by definition a political and social term leading into the public (dis)order.
What then could an “ironist liberal” or a “liberal ironist” possibly be?
This question alludes to the challenge of combining both spheres—a combination
which is labeled by Rorty as ‘metaphysical’. On the more concrete level of (i) to
(iii) it is irritating in Rorty’s own terms that he is interested in this separation at all
because literature’s significance consists, according to Rorty, in making us more sen-
sible and accessible to others (cf. PZ, 164; R, 61) even if he characterizes literature
as tool of self-creation, thereby restricting its use to oneself [ad (i)]. Understanding
ourselves as persons who (re)describe ourselves in new and surprising ways engages
22 See I. U. Dalferth on the term ‘post-secular’: Dalferth (2010).
23 Sometimes, the borders between religion, philosophy and literature break down, for instance, when
Rorty characterizes religion itself as a kind of literature or a ‘strong poem’; see PC, 32 & 33.
24 Rorty says (“Philosophy as a transitional genre”, in PC, 91 & 93):
[I]ntellectuals of the West have, since the Renaissance, progressed through three stages: they have
hoped for redemption first from God, then from philosophy, and now from literature.
As I am using the terms >literature< and >literary culture<, a culture which has substituted lit-
erature for both religion and philosophy finds redemption neither in a non-cognitive relation to a
non-human person nor in a cognitive relation to propositions, but in non-cognitive relations to other
human beings, relations mediated by human artifacts such as books and buildings, paintings and
songs. These artifacts provide a sense of alternative ways of being human.
25 This is an important semantic shift: ‘secularization’ is no longer restricted to be only an analytic term
but is loaded with an ideological rigor; it is not (only) a description (and could no longer be criticized as not
doing justice to the ‘facts’) but it becomes a slogan. To some extent, however, Rorty sticks to its descriptive
meaning and here, unfortunately, he has an oversimplified notion of secularization compounding the tra-
ditional view of separating state and church with the decline of religious belief in general. This creates an
obstacle for recognizing in which sense we are dealing today with “public religions” (Casanova 1994) or
for considering the possibility that secularization itself might be an element in at least the Christian tradition
(see Gogarten 1956, Chapter 2).
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us in something that is not merely private but open to dialogue that we won’t otherwise
engage in without others. In other words, or (re)descriptions come from somewhere
else, and to adopt or repudiate these descriptions is an altogether non-private act, shared
or ‘negotiated’ with near or even remote humans [ad (ii)]. The same goes for literature
which transcends the sectors in ways that are essential for this means of expression
touching our identity by being rooted in communities of individuals [ad (iii)].
However, it is neither clear what is entailed by distinguishing these spheres, nor it
is clear which idea of privacy Rorty has in mind. Insofar as it is conceptually impos-
sible to defend a complete inwardness disconnected to something other than itself,
a so called ‘private’ religion has necessarily more than one member. At religion’s
heart lies an irreducible publicity—a lesson to be learned, for instance, from Wittgen-
stein’s anti-private-language-argument(s) and Taylor’s analytic hermeneutics mirrored
in the famous phrase on humans as “self-interpreting animals”.26 For understanding
ourselves in surprising new ways we do not have to leave the “cocoon of private self-
creation”.27 We are already ‘outside’. In creating oneself one has left oneself—and
religion escalates this very problem for the Rortian dualism of spheres.
Rorty’s picture(s) of faith
Insofar as self-creation belongs to the private sphere and insofar as religion itself is
such a self-creative vehicle, according to Rorty’s logic, the latter must be doomed to
privacy. It is, nonetheless, revealing that Rorty is explicit about restricting religion
to the private sector while simultaneously denying religion to be a proper means of
self-creation. This suggests a deep tension undergirding Rorty’s attitude towards reli-
gion. This tension, however, is rooted in several different pictures of what religion is
or could mean, none of which mean the same thing. I would like to distinguish three
of these contexts in which Rorty locates religious beliefs.
Supranaturalism
Rorty is not really in touch with the theological literature or philosophical approaches
contemplating the possibilities of religious sense. One of the relevant sources of
the pragmatist Rorty is the godfather of this line of thinking, William James. Rorty
admires James for his philosophical coolness in the sense of cooling down allegedly
‘deep’ problems to a matter of socially developed questions that we have to deal with
accordingly. One prominent example is the notion of truth and its pragmatic read-
ing as usability. Furthermore, Rorty has sympathies with James even when it comes
to his characterization of religious faith in the main work The Varieties of Religious
Experience from 1902. One reason for Rorty’s appreciation might be that James’ inter-
pretation locates faith within the individual experience, not in a socially designed net-
work. This leads James to devalue rituals and to criticize the institutional (de)formation
26 Taylor (2005, p. 63).
27 Elstain (2003, p. 145).
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of faith. What others, like Charles Taylor, take to be problematic, namely, that James
was unable to draw connections from faith’s ‘inwardness’ to a visible and practical
religious involvement,28 Rorty welcomes with open arms because here he meets a real
proponent of the descriptive claim that religion is private which would make the call
for its restriction superfluous.
There is a tiny problem. Apart from the question of whether James is right in his
analysis (of course, he is wrong in more than one regard), he finishes the Varieties
by backing up the individual faith by what he calls “over-belief”; in the end, James
seems to think that religious belief refers necessarily to some entity beyond space and
time—an assumption that is at odds with what James considers usually to be philo-
sophically allowed. By falling back to a supranaturalist framework, James, too much
for Rorty’s taste, “betrayed his own pragmatism” (SH, 160). Rorty himself seems to
think that if this happens even to his hero it will happen to everyone in the subject.
Religion without some sort of metaphysical underpinning would lack any sense.
Pragmatism
Later on, supranaturalist fantasies do not play a significant role in Rorty’s critique
of religious belief in general and of Christianity in particular (interestingly, Rorty
did not participate in the theism-bashing of, for instance, Daniel Dennett and Richard
Dawkins).29 Perhaps one of the conclusions Rorty was ready to draw from James’ con-
fusions had been not to betray his own (neo)pragmatist standpoint—what he would
do if he maintained that the religious convictions are ‘wrong’. Accordingly, he says
farewell to the old question whether there is a God or not. The problem of God’s exis-
tence is replaced by the pragmatic move concerning the usability of God; we should
ask, Rorty says, whether a certain religious tradition incorporates a vocabulary with
which we could enrich our picture of ourselves and of our surroundings (cf. PC, 20–21,
24–25).30 Or in Robert Brandom’s terminology: It is crucial which inferences we can
draw from the religious vocabulary and to which divergent responses it leads us.31
Religion of love (or: Gianni Vattimo’s agape)
In his last years Rorty got in touch with Gianni Vattimo, an Italian writer and phi-
losopher whose work he appreciated very much. Vattimo has a Catholic background
and after having lived in tense distance to the religion of his childhood and youth over
decades he regained a sense of the depth of this cosmos. Vattimo himself reports in dif-
ferent works over this important shift that undermines on very different levels Rorty’s
28 Cf. Taylor (2002, p. 28).
29 See Brümmer (2010).
30 Rorty combines this thesis with the further claim that ontology is to be replaced by cultural politics
responsible for integrating or repudiating particular vocabularies against others; cf. PC, 5, 24–25.
31 Rorty mentions also a pragmatic version of theism (see SH, 156) whose participants argue not about
whether God exist, but that the thesis of God’s theistically conceived existence does the same job as the
assumption that tables or quarks exist: in all these cases the existence of pragmatically justified.
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thesis of separation.32 Vattimo makes his private concern public; perhaps he uses pub-
licity (the publicity of his work and its reception) to understand what he describes in
the first place. This operation—to open oneself beyond privacy in order to understand
oneself in a self-creative act—is not untypical for a hermeneutical thinker. Further-
more, Vattimo’s picture of religious belief is concentrated on finding the appropriate
attitude towards a post-secular age—an era that has already faced all sorts of dying
or dead faiths. The ‘resurrected’ faith is, for Vattimo, a kind of obligation: we cannot
live today without answering to the Bible, he says (cf. RV, 65). His answer, however,
consists in characterizing the Catholic confession as a faith of love—in the Greek
sense of agape—as the only rule we need and have (cf. RV, 50).
According to Vattimo, Jesus Christ unmasked the metaphysical tradition which
makes him a “weak thinker”, someone who said (or: would say) farewell to metaphys-
ical fantasies but without regretting their decline (cf. PC, 33). What we have then is a
Christian ethics based on (not founded or justified by) the law of love and the refusal
of violence.33 There is no power ‘behind’ that love (that’s why Vattimo holds that
Christian love is the limit of secularization). This, finally, let him recover the Enlight-
enment movement once again—but now as enlightened Enlightenment undermining
the traditional conflict between faith and reason, which is still defended implicitly by
Rorty.
It is obvious that Vattimo’s religion of love is hardly to be restricted to a private
sector without it being totally destroyed. Rorty finds himself in an uncomfortable situ-
ation that is revealing for his whole dualist thinking: on the one hand he has sympathies
with Vattimo’s Catholicism centered around love; on the other hand its publicity and
its necessarily public impact is at odds with Rorty’s urgent call for different sectors.34
What can we learn from this threefold development? First of all that Rorty met
in Vattimo someone who shares some of his most important philosophical values but
who has a very different attitude to religion; Vattimo stands for a religion of love as
engine for the promotion of solidarity and tolerance, privately and, as such, publically;
obviously, the Catholic tradition signifies for Vattimo exactly what Rorty described
as the pragmatic turn within our philosophical dealing with religion: namely, that the
crucial question is not whether God exists, but whether the ‘language of faith’ is able
to capture one’s self-understanding by organizing and deepening it; that is exactly
the case with Vattimo. And not falling into the confusion James succumbed to the
pragmatist Rorty has to allow for the possibility that the ‘language of faith’ is actually
able to capture and create one’s self-understanding; otherwise he, perhaps even more
than James, would betray the pragmatist tradition!
Nevertheless, Rorty sticks to his claim; the fact that religion could be part of our
self-creation does not, for him, entail that it should be public. As we have seen, this
claim is confused since it misses privacy’s non-private character. But if we assume for
32 Cf. Vattimo (1999, p. 71).
33 The content is mirrored in the style because Vattimo presents his book Belief as an “upbuilding discourse”
(ibid., p. 110—a reference to Kierkegaard).
34 Interestingly, Rorty restricts here his critique of Christianity to the institution that represents it. There-
fore, the call for separation refers only to coming to terms with the church as institution which deescalates
the problem to (just) a legal matter; cf. RV, 41.
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a moment that this pitfall did not exist, we run into another problem: Rorty’s hidden
Cartesianism! Apparently, Rorty was not fully aware of the fact that he reactivated a
picture of the self he was constantly and eagerly critical of: an autonomous agent secur-
ing himself isolated from his surroundings. It is difficult to see how to appreciate the
Nietzschean legacy (if Rorty’s ‘separationism’ is actually in Nietzsche’s sense—what
I doubt) without standing with one leg precisely in the dualist tradition to which Rorty
said goodbye more than once. How do create both selves one identity? How does the
private self interact with his public brother? And where? (Perhaps in the epiphysis as
Descartes might have suggested?) The institution of privacy remains ambivalent—or
metaphorically speaking: Rorty cannot keep the igloo cold enough in order to avoid
the melting point.
To conclude: irony without irony?
We have now all ingredients together to deal constructively with Rorty’s claim: If
self-creation is necessarily a publically shared act insofar as my self-picture is not
independent from the view of others, if religious belief is such a self-creation or con-
tributes to it in certain ways, if this self-creative understanding should be ironic in the
sense of playing seriously with different vocabularies, if this ironic game widens our
moral sense in deepening our ability to accept the non-relative contingency of our own
hopes, desires, expectations and commitments, if this moral sense effects the public
virtue of tolerance and solidarity by an ethics of love—if all this is true, and it is true
according to Rorty, then religion belongs essentially to the public sphere because it
donates new possibilities as surprising, unexpected and interesting descriptions that
irritate, correct, deepen—as possibilities—what we take to be reality.35
In order to recognize this you have to be a real ironist—“the sort of person who faces
up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires—someone
sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central
beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance.”
We should use Rorty as an author who showed us what irony could come to—in the
positive sense of an ironic tolerance and openness as well as in the problematic sense
of an irony without irony.36 A ‘public religion’ that deserves its name might help us to
complete Rorty’s lesson by teaching us to be “the sort of person” who we are not yet,
but will hopefully some day become: a self-ironic animal who sometimes sit under
the pulpit and may even sometimes stand on it!
35 What Rorty presents as the eminent force of and the need to new self-descriptions is prominently fulfilled
in religion as a collection of language-events. Of course, it would be necessary to work out in more detail
this approach that has its sources in what has been called “hermeneutical theology” (including authors like
Ernst Fuchs, Gerhard Ebeling and Eberhard Jüngel)—but this is the work for another paper, hopefully a
book.
36 See for the notion of a negative irony: Reece (2002, esp. chapter 6: “From the Metaphysical to the
Ordinary”).
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